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CHRISTIAN WITNESS, MORAL ANTHROPOLOGY,
AND THE DEATH PENALTY
RicHARD W. GARNErr*
In this age of toleration, [no one] will ever try actively to
interfere with our religious faith, provided we enjoy it quietly with
our friends and do not make a public nuisance of it[.]
-William James1
[W]ithout witness, there is no argument.
-Stanley Hauerwas
2
"Are human beings different from meat?" A recent book
review opens with the complaint that this is "[a] n example of the
worst type of modern philosophical question[;]" a question that,
"[f] or those among us who have never been invited into Socratic
dialogue by, say, a porterhouse, . . . is dumb in ways rarely
thought possible before."' The reviewer is right, of course-the
question is "dumb." Then again, we might wonder if this "worst
kind" of question is really all that different from the Psalmist's
own: "Lord, what is man ... that thou thinkest of him?"4 The
question, it turns out, is both perennial and profound-"What is
man, and why and how does it matter?"
Now, because my contribution to this volume has been
billed as a "theological" reflection on the death penalty, I should
* Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School, Notre Dame,
Indiana. This Essay is based on remarks offered on January 25, 2002, at a con-
ference sponsored by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, "A Call for
Reckoning: Religion and the Death Penalty." I am grateful to Robert Burt, Fr.
John Coughlin, Rebecca D'arcy, Gilbert Meilaender, andJay Tidmarsh for their
comments and suggestions. I have addressed elsewhere several of the themes
and points raised in this Essay. See Richard W. Garnett, Sectarian Reflections on
Lawyers' Ethics and Death Row Volunteers, 77 NOTRE DAME L. RE%,. 795 (2002);
Richard W. Garnett, A Quiet Faith? Taxes, Politics, and the Privatization of Religion,
42 B.C. L. REv. 771 (2001).
1. WILLIAM JAMES, THE WILL TO BELIEVE AND OTHER ESSAYS IN POPULAR
PHILOSOPHY xi (1897) (Dover ed. 1956).
2. STANLEY HAUERWAS, WITH THE GRAIN OF THE UNIVERSE: THE CHURCH'S
WITNESS AND NATURAL THEOLOGY 241 (2001).
3. Matthew Rose, Things Fall Apart, WKLY. STANDARD, June 17, 2002, at 39
(reviewing JOHN LuKAcs, AT THE END OF AN AGE (2002)).
4. Psalms 143:3 (Douay-Rheims).
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emphasize at the outset that I am not a "theologian," but a Chris-
tian layman, lawyer, and law-teacher with, I suppose, some exper-
tise in the areas of criminal justice and "law and religion." That
said, my aim in this Essay is to offer an answer-a Christian
answer, I hope-to one of the several provocative questions
posed by this symposium's hosts: "What role ought religious
beliefs play in a pluralistic democratic society that often
presumes strict boundaries between matters of private faith and
political life?"'5 More particularly, what should Christians say who
are engaged in dialogue and debate with our fellow citizens in
the public square of civil society? In Professor Elshtain's words,
"how should we talk?"
6
Let me start where I want to end: I will argue, first, that we
should resist, as distorting and dishonest, the imposition of such
"strict" boundaries between "matters of private faith and political
life;" and, second, that in the context of our public arguments
about capital punishment, the task for faithful believers is not
merely to baptize the policy analyses and preferences of aboli-
tionist or other interest groups, but rather to bear authentic
Christian witness to what Pope John Paul II has called the "moral
truth about the human person."7
I.
I believe that moral problems-and the death penalty poses,
inescapably, such a problem-are anthropological problems,
because moral arguments are built, for the most part, on anthro-
pological presuppositions.8 In other words, as one scholar put it,
our attempts at moral judgment tend to reflect our "founda-
tional assumptions about what it means to be human."9 And
these assumptions matter. If they are untruthful, there is little
reason for confidence in the analysis that follows, or for surprise
at unsound conclusions. My teacher and colleague Thomas Shaf-
5. A Call for Reckoning: Religion and the Death Penalty, at http://pew
forum.org/deathpenalty/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2002) (on file with the Notre
Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
6. Jean Bethke Elshtain, How Should We Talk?, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 731
(1999).
7. John Paul II, Ad Limina Address to the Bishops of Texas, Oklahoma
and Arkansas, at http://www.cin.org/jp2/jp980606.html (June 6, 1998) (on file
with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
8. Jean Bethke Elshtain, The Dignity of the Human Person and the Idea of
Human Rights: Four Inquiries, 14J.L. & RELIGION 53, 53 (1999-2000).
9. Rev. John J. Coughlin, Law and Theology: Reflections on What it Means to
Be Human from a Franciscan Perspective, 74 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 609, 609 (2000)
(noting the "perennial nature" of the "anthropological question [:]" "What does
it mean to be a human being?").
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fer got it right: "Ethics"-or, "thinking about morals"-"is valid
only to the extent that it truthfully describes what is going on.'
It strikes me that there is a crying need for anthropological
truth-telling in the context of what passes today for public moral
argument on the death penalty and similarly weighty matters.
And my claim here is that religious believers not only may, but
must, contribute what Shaffer might call a truthful description of
"what is going on" to the public dialogue about capital punish-
ment. We are called today to argue with our fellows about
human nature, to provide our political communities what Cardi-
nal Wojtyla of Krakow called a "kind of 'recapitulation' of the
inviolable mystery of the person."" But not only to argue. I am
convinced by Stanley Hauerwas's recently published Gifford Lec-
tures that, in the end, "Christian argument rests on witness."'
12
Indeed, "the life of the Christian cannot avoid becoming the life
of a witness"3 -a witness, in this context, to the truth about who
we are and why it matters."4 This might sound, I admit, like the-
ology, not politics, policy, or law. But I understand Hauerwas's
point to be that Christian theology, revealed by God and rightly
understood, "makes claims on persons' lives[;]" true, it "begins
with God," but in so doing, "it tells humans who they are and
how they should be." 15 And, I submit, the moral anthropology
that attends Christian theology "makes claims" as well on our
arguments about capital punishment.
Of course, by framing the death penalty problem in terms of
moral anthropology-and "moral anthropology" is used here to
mean "an account of what it is about the human person that does
the work in moral arguments about what we ought or ought not
to do and about how we ought or ought not to be treated" 6-I
10. Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEX. L.
REv. 963, 965 (1987); see also H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE MORAL TRADITION OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: A THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 264 (1993)
("The norm of Christian social ethics is the obligation to see and speak
truthfully.").
11. See George Weigel, John Paul II and the Crisis of Humanism, in THE SEC-
OND ONE THOUSAND YEARS: TEN PEOPLE WHO DEFINED A MILLENNIUM 114, 116
(Richard John Neuhaus ed., 2001) (quoting letter from Cardinal Wojtyla to
Henri de Lubac).
12. HAUERWAS, supra note 2, at 210.
13. Id. at 229.
14. Id. at 194.
15. Id. at 205.
16. See, e.g., MICHAELJ. PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR INQUIR-
IES 7 (1998) (arguing that because "every human being is sacred," there are
"some things that ought never.., to be done to any human being"). There are,
I realize, other ways to use this term. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Danin's New
Bulldog, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1718, 1719 (1998) (using "moral anthropology" to
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do not mean to deny that the imposition of the death penalty
raises a wide variety of challenging, provocative, important, and
perhaps more practical questions. For example, does the death
penalty deter crime? If so, do the "costs" of capital punishment
justify its deterrence "benefits?" How much confidence should
we have in the accuracy of the results of capital trials, and how
might we increase that confidence? How much appellate and
post-conviction review is necessary, appropriate, and feasible in
capital cases? To what extent, if at all, should American constitu-
tional and criminal law relating to the death penalty reflect devel-
opments in international law, and in the domestic laws of other
countries? Are death-eligible defendants provided with adequate
legal representation? Do prosecutors and jurors discriminate on
the basis of race or sex in the imposition of the death penalty?
Does the United States Constitution require that juries, not
judges, make the decision for death,17 or that some convicted
murderers-say, those with severe developmental disabilities or
teenagers-be exempted categorically from execution?"8 And so
on.
Even this quick survey of the debate's landscape confirms
that the disputants' attention is focused more on these issues
than on abstract questions of moral anthropology. And certainly,
these and other constitutional, empirical, administrative, and
even fiscal problems deserve and require careful attention,
thoughtful consideration, and even our engaged activism. The
questions, and their answers, matter. (It would be strange if I
thought otherwise, given that I teach courses in criminal law and
have a client who, until recently, sat on death row.)
Still, this volume aspires to serve as more than (yet) another
policy-oriented "white paper." It purports instead to be the
response of a group of faithful believers and engaged citizens to
a "Call for Reckoning," a call that presumes and is intended to
mine the "resources"-the "unique standpoints and important
reflective dimensions"-that "religious voices" can and should
provide to neighbors, voters, legislators, and civil society.' 9 And
mean the examination of "[w]hat best explains how human beings developed
the disposition to make judgments of moral right and wrong").
17. See Ring v. Arizona, 533 U.S. 976 (2002) (Sixth Amendment's jury-
trial guarantee requires that juries, not judges, find facts legally necessary for
the imposition of a death sentence).
18. See Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002) (execution of "mentally
retarded" offenders violates the Eighth Amendment's ban on "cruel and unu-
sual" punishments).
19. See, e.g., A Call for Reckoning: Religion and the Death Penalty, supra
note 5.
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so, what is asked of us, and what is needed from us, is not merely
a "faith-based" echo of others' proposals and prescriptions, but
something distinctive, authentic, unsettling, and even radical.2 °
Now, this is not to claim that faithful witness requires impru-
dence. We have, in any event, no guarantee, of course, that our
neighbors and leaders will like what they hear; or that they will
listen at all. 21 Still, what our public square needs, and what I
believe in the death penalty context is required of us, is a
counter-cultural argument-a Story, perhaps 2-about the dig-
nity and destiny of the human person, "the noblest work of
God-infinitely valuable, relentlessly unique, endlessly interest-
ing."' 23 I am convinced that we can best help our fellow citizens
reach the right conclusion about what to do with convicted mur-
derers not so much by dusting the usual arguments with God-talk
as by challenging our culture to understand who and what these
condemned persons are, and why it should make a difference.
II.
I teach, study, and write about crime, punishment, and relig-
ious freedom at Notre Dame Law School. Ours is a relatively
close-knit community, with a still-real sense of Christian mission.
At the heart of that mission is inviting and (we hope) inspiring
young lawyers to bring their faith with them to their studies, and
then to carry it away with them into their lives in the law. Our
view is that we should not expect young lawyers to think well
about crime and punishment; about retribution, forgiveness,
abuse of power, and the common good; about their clients'
20. See, e.g., POWELL, supra note 10, at 262 n.10 ("Christian theology...
provides an intellectual and moral basis for a social criticism of American ...
law and politics that is both more radical and more truthful than that based
upon secular leftist ideologies.").
21. See HAUERWAS, supra note 2, at 16.
I cannot help but appear impolite, since I must maintain that the God
who moves the sun and the stars is the same God who was incarnate in
Jesus of Nazareth. Given the politics of modernity, the humility
required for those who worship the God revealed in the cross and res-
urrection of Christ cannot help but appear as arrogance.
Id.
22. See Steven D. Smith, The "Secular, "the "Religious, " and the "Moral": What
Are We TalkingAbout?, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 487, 498 (2001) (observing that
many people believe that "this world and this life are part of an overarching
Story" and that this Story is what provides the answer to the Socratic question,
"How should I live?"); HAUERWAS, supra note 2, at 215 (observing that "Christi-
anity is not a 'position,' just another set of beliefs, but a story").
23. Thomas L. Shaffer, Human Nature and Moral Responsibility in Lawyer-
Client Relationships, 40 Am.J. JuRS. 1, 2 (1995) (quoting Chisholm v. Georgia, 2
Dallas 419, 462-63 (1792)).
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despair, fear, contrition, and hope; or about corruption, redemp-
tion, damnation, and beatitude, if we tell them to wall off their
faith from their practices like a conflicted-out law firm partner.
We are encouraged to challenge our students with the suggestion
that any purported resolution of a legal, moral, or public-policy
question whose premise is that lawyers or citizens who are relig-
ious believers should hamstring their deliberations by dis-inte-
grating their lives is really no resolution at all.
This volume, then, presents a welcome opportunity to
reflect on the challenge that I pose regularly to myself and to my
students of integrating our professional, political, intellectual,
and religious lives. After all, it is the shared aim of the Pew
Forum on Religion and Public Life, and of each of the contribu-
tors to this volume, to explore and encourage precisely this kind
of integration. This shared aim proceeds, I suspect, from a
shared premise; namely, the proposition that the claims, argu-
ments, and expression of religious believers and communities
not only have a place and a role in the "public square" of civil
society, but are properly directed at its transformation.
We should recall at the outset, though, that this founda-
tional premise cannot-at least, not in the context of contempo-
rary elite opinion-be treated as given, or taken for granted.
That religious believers should be speaking at all is, it turns out,
hardly less contested than the substance of what we are called to
say. After all, John Rawls became "one of the most influential
political philosophers of the 20th century"24 in no small part by
making the case that public arguments must sound in "public
reason" alone.25 Religion and religious conviction, on the other
hand, "are purely private matters that have no role or place" in
the political arena.26 Richard Rorty, another of our leading pub-
lic intellectuals, put the matter more bluntly: in his view, what we
are about in this volume is not civic-minded, but gauche, and it is
not public-spirited, but "bad taste to bring religion into discus-
sions of public policy."' 27 This is because for Rorty, as Stephen
Carter memorably put it, religion is "like building model air-
24. John Rawls Awarded 1999 National Humanities Medal, at http://www.
hup.harvard.edu/Awards/rawlsnhm.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2002) (on file
with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
25. See, e.g,John Rawls, Political Liberalism 212-54 (1993) (defending an
ethos of "public reason" that requires, inter alia, that arguments about public
policy be couched in terms that are "accessible" to all citizens and that do not
presuppose adherence to any religion or other "comprehensive" philosophy).
26. William Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 844
(1993).
27. Richard Rorty, Religion as Conversation-Stopper, 3 COMMON KNOWLEDGE
1, 2 (1994).
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planes, just another hobby: something quiet, something trivial-
not really a fit activity for intelligent.. . adults.
28
Nor can these be brushed aside as the views of a few ivory-
tower luminaries; only a glance through the Letters to the Editor
or the Sunday morning talk shows is needed to confirm that such
opinions are deeply rooted in both the popular culture and in
the commentariat. Alan Wolfe's recent work would seem to con-
firm that contemporary Americans respect, value, and even cher-
ish religious faith, but only so long as it stays in its place, and
remains personal, private, and "non-judgmental. ' 29 It appears to
be broadly-if not deeply-accepted that religious faith really is
something that can be privatized, and cordoned off from civic
and public life; and also that such a separation is somehow con-
sistent with, if not required by, American constitutional law and
the political morality of liberal democracy.
It is against this backdrop that a generation of writers and
thinkers-lawyers and legal scholars in particular-has wrestled
with the "religion in the public square" question, and with the
extent to which the contemporary liberal state, or a modern con-
stitutional democracy, can, may, and should allow religiously-
grounded arguments and expression in the public square of civil
society. Almost all of the leading lights have weighed in, and the
conversation shows few signs of flagging."0 I could not possibly
do justice here either to the richness of the debate itself or to the
care with which the participants have honed their arguments.3'
28. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW
AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 22 (1993).
29. See ALAN WOLFE, ONE NATION, AFTER ALL (1998); see also Elshtain,
supra note 6, at 743-44.
Wolfe's middle-class respondents begin by viewing religion as a private
matter to be discussed only reluctantly, a position that already cuts
rather dramatically against the American grain.... The general view
is this: If I am quiet about what I believe and everybody else is quiet
about what he or she believes, then nobody interferes with the rights
of anybody else.
Id.
30. For a small, but still representative, sampling of the legal and politi-
cal-theory literature, see, for example, Symposium, Religiously Based Morality: Its
Proper Place in American Law and Public Policy?, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 217
(2001); Symposium, Religion in the Public Square, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 647
(2001); RELIGION AND CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM (PaulJ. Weithman ed., 1997);
ROBERT AUDI & NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE 147
(1997); Symposium, The Role of Religion in Public Debate in Liberal Society, SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 643 (1993); KEN GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND
POLITICAL CHOICE (1988).
31. But see Elshtain, supra note 6, at 732-33 ("[A] powerful school, associ-
ated with the work ofJohn Rawls .... holds that when religious persons enter
the public sphere they are obliged to do so in a secular civic idiom, shorn of any
2003]
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Still, before trying to make the case for a public and distinctively
Christian argument about what it means to be human, it makes
sense to say a few things in defense of "public and distinctively
Christian arguments" generally.
As I see it, there are at least three different strands to the
"religion in the public square" debate: The first has to do with
constitutional law, the second with the political morality of secu-
lar democracies, and the third with faithfulness and theological
authenticity. That is, in trying to determine the appropriate role
and content of faith-based expression in public life, we might ask
not only "what does the First Amendment Religion Clause per-
mit?" and, "in a liberal democracy, committed to equality and
characterized by pluralism, how ought citizens to act and argue?"
but also, "can religious believers, institutions, and associations
keep the faith as they engage the world, and if so, how?" Putting
this last question differently, the faithful might wonder how we
are to square our (understandable) desire for a voice in the dia-
logue, and for a "place at the table," with what we might regard
as our obligation to speak truthfully and prophetically about God
and man-in other words, to "build and set the table itself[?]"2
I will start with the third, theological dimension of the
debate, because before we tackle the question whether we may
respond, in the idiom of faith, to the questions tendered in this
symposium while remaining a citizen, we ought to ask-putting
aside the Justices and John Rawls-whether and to what extent
we may do so while remaining Christians.33 More particularly, we
might ask, first, should believers enter the arena at all?; and sec-
ond, if they do, what should they say?
Meaning no disrespect to what my colleague Thomas Shaf-
fer has described as the "Gathered Church" tradition-" [a] n
ancient and sometimes inevitable tradition among Jews and
Christians teaches believers to get together and then get out of
explicit reference to religious commitment and belief. I will not rehearse this
position yet again. It has been done over and over to the point of near
tedium.").
32. HAUERWAS, supra note 2, at 238-39 n.77 (citing Michael J. Baxter,
C.S.C., Not Outrageous Enough, FIRST THINGS 14-16 (May 2001)).
33. See, e.g., Michael J. Perry, Christians, the Bible, and Same-Sex Unions, 36
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 449 (2001).
In deciding whether she should forgo or at least limit reliance on her
biblically grounded moral belief, a citizen of a liberal democracy who
is a Christian will want to consult the wisdom of her own religious
tradition at least as much as she will want to consult either the morality
of liberal democracy or . . .the American constitutional morality of
religious freedom.
Id. at 451.
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the way" 3 4-my claim is that the answer to the first of these latter
two questions is "yes." I believe that religious faith in general-
and Christianity in particular-makes claims about the meaning
and purpose of life and the universe that push the believer inexo-
rably toward engagement in public life and with "political" mat-
ters. As the theologian Johann Metz observed, the
"eschatological promises of the scriptural tradition-freedom,
peace, justice, reconciliation-cannot be made private. They
force one ever anew into social responsibility." 5 To the extent
that religion claims to "contain[ ] objectively true insights into
human social existence"-and, generally speaking, it does-that
"encompassing account of existence necessarily influences the
polis."3 6 The state should not banish faith to a "nonpublic
ghetto," nor should the faithful retreat there." And, in fact, they
have not.
Turning back, then, to the debate's first, legal dimension,
we are, I suspect, on familiar ground. The First Amendment to
our Nation's Constitution promises that "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof[.]" Few constitutional provisions have a
comparable hold on the popular imagination, and fewer still
have been so misunderstood and misrepresented.3 s For more
than fifty years, judges, scholars, and citizens alike have confused
Thomas Jefferson's "figure of speech"3 9 about a "wall of separa-
34. Thomas L. Shaffer, Review Essay, Stephen Carter and Religion in America,
62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1601, 1609 (1994).
The notion here is that the civil society in which each community of
the faithful exists ... is irrelevant to the communal business of believ-
ers. Believers are pilgrims in the world, passers-through, "resident
aliens." At best, the civil society is irrelevant. At worst, the civil society
is corrupting and destructive, and if the community of the faithful
exists for anything it exists to protect itself from secular corruption, so
that it can remember what it is, preserve its identity in teaching and in
ritual observance, perpetuate itself through educating its children,
and wait for the Lord to come back.
Id. (quoting STANLEY HAUERWAS & WILLIAM H. WILLIMON, RESIDENT ALIENS: LIFE
IN THE CHRISTIAN COLONY (1989)).
35. JOHANNES B. METZ, THEOLOGY OF THE WORLD 153 (Glen-Doepel
trans., 1969).
36. Gerard V. Bradley, Dogmatomachy-A "Privatization" Theory, 30 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 275, 277, 329 (1986).
37. Id. at 280.
38. I will not impose on the reader a catalogue of the flaws and failings of
the Supreme Court's Religion Clause jurisprudence. For (just) one powerful
critique, see STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CON-
STITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1995).
39. See McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 247 (1948) (Reed, J.,
dissenting) ("A rule of law should not be drawn from a figure of speech.").
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tion between church and State" with a rule of constitutional law
that would outlaw not only fairly obvious interferences with, and
impositions upon, religious freedom, but also obligate the state
and its courts to scrub clean the public square of all "sectarian"
residue. Dean Kathleen Sullivan, for example, has argued force-
fully and prominently that the First Amendment's Establishment
Clause was designed not simply to end official sponsorship of
churches but also to affirmatively establish a secular "civil order
for the resolution of disputes."4 ° In other words, she contends,
the Constitution is not simply a charter for limited government
and ordered liberty, it sets the ground rules for deliberation
among citizens about the common good.
Dean Sullivan's view is, I think, mistaken. The First Amend-
ment's "Establishment Clause" is directed at governments only; it
neither mandates nor implies a duty of self-censorship by believ-
ers; it does not demand a Naked Public Square; and active and
engaged participation by the faithful is perfectly consistent with
the institutional separation of church and state that the Constitu-
tion is understood to require. The Constitution imposes no
"don't ask, don't tell" rule on religionists presumptuous enough
to venture into public life.4 1 True, it is not hard to find examples
of judicial rhetoric and decisions that provide support for Sulli-
van's secular-order claims. Our courts and judges have at times
seemed more worried about the "divisiveness"4 2 and "coercion""
thought to attend public manifestations of religious commitment
than about the threats posed to authentic religious freedom and
pluralism by their own overreactions. As a result, their pro-
nouncements have, on occasion, in Chief Justice Rehnquist's
words, seemed to "bristle[ ] with hostility to all things religious in
public life."44
The trend appears to be away from such ahistorical aversion,
though, supplying good reason to believe that courts are aban-
doning the enterprise of monitoring the religiosity of public dis-
course. Demands that religious believers either muzzle
themselves or retreat from civil society-i.e., that they take their
40. Kathleen Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REv.
195, 197 (1992).
41. Elshtain, supra note 6, at 744 ("To tell religious believers to keep
quiet, else they interfere with my rights simply by speaking out is an intolerant
idea. It is, in effect, to tell folks that they can not really believe what they
believe or be who they are: Don't ask. Don't tell.") (emphasis omitted).
42. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
43. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
44. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 318 (2000) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
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faith and go home-are increasingly rejected. In Mitchell v.
Helms, for example-a case involving loans of computers and
other educational materials to public, private, and religious
schools serving low-income students-Justice Clarence Thomas
was joined by three of his colleagues in disclaiming a "most
bizarre" reading of the First Amendment that would "reserve spe-
cial hostility for those who take their religion seriously, [and]
who think that their religion should affect the whole of their
lives."45 And Justice Antonin Scalia sounded a similar note not
long ago, going out of his way in Good News Club v. Milford Central
School to emphasize that the Establishment Clause imposes no
special obligation on devout religious believers to "sterili[ze]"
their speech before entering the public forum.4 6 In that case, a
comfortable majority of the Justices agreed that the Establish-
ment Clause does not require-and, indeed, the First Amend-
ment's free-speech guarantee does not permit-a small-town
public school to exclude a Christian student club from otherwise-
generally-available public facilities, simply because the club's
activities were unabashedly religious.
So, putting aside for present purposes the many difficult
questions about what the Constitution allows governments to say
and do with respect to religious belief, practice, and institutions;
and notwithstanding the widespread misperceptions about the
public-square implications of our "separation of church and
state;" it should be quite clear that the First Amendment's Relig-
ion Clause erects no barrier to-in fact, it protects-the determi-
nation of religious believers to respond, in public debate and as
believers, to the "Call for Reckoning." In Michael Perry's words,
political reliance on religiously-grounded morality is both per-
mitted and protected by the Constitution.47
But again, there is more-much more-to the problem of
religious voices in the public square than constitutional law. One
might insist that, whatever the positive law might permit, political
morality and the "ethics of citizenship"48 counsel that religious
believers ought still to cabin their commitments, and translate
their claims, when they deliberate with their fellows about the
common good. One might ask, in other words, whether "politi-
cal reliance on religiously grounded morality is illegitimate"-
even if not unconstitutional-"in a liberal democracy like the
45. 530 U.S. 793, 827-28 (2000) (plurality opinion).
46. 533 U.S. 98, 124 (2001) (ScaliaJ., concurring).
47. Michael J. Perry, Why Political Reliance on Religiously Grounded Morality
Does Not Violate the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 663 (2001).
48. Paul Weithman, Religious Reasons and the Duties of Membership, 36 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 511, 511 (2001).
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United States[.]" 49 One might wonder whether, even if expres-
sing, and acting upon, one's faith in public life does not make
me an outlaw, does it nonetheless make me a bad citizen, a bad
democrat, or a bad liberal?
The answer, according to more than a few of our more
prominent theorists, to these questions is "yes." John Rawls,
again, has famously contended that the morality of political liber-
alism requires religious believers, when engaged in public dis-
course on public matters, to employ a secularized, "accessible"
vocabulary, and to proceed in their arguments from similar
premises. Stephen Macedo has sounded a similar note, writing
that "[t] he liberal claim is that it is wrong to seek to coerce peo-
ple on grounds that they cannot share without converting to
one's faith."5 ° Not that we should be surprised by the fact that
many of our most gifted thinkers embrace these and similar
views; after all, these positions follow from, and cohere nicely
with, the "religion as a hobby" mind-set identified by Professor
Carter. If religion really is a purely "private" idiosyncrasy, not
only in terms of the scope of its influence but also in terms of the
matters to which it speaks, then it would be strange, and perhaps
not very responsible citizenship, to speak and act as though one's
faith had consequences for state and society.
I cannot do much more here than report that these thinkers
are mistaken. The political morality of liberal democracy, rightly
understood, does not require self-censorship on the part of per-
sons who are believers and citizens. Nicholas Wolterstorff put it
well:
[T]he ethic of the citizen in a liberal democracy imposes
no restrictions on the reasons people offer in their discus-
sion of political issues in the public square .... If the
position adopted, and the manner in which it is acted on,
are compatible with the concept of liberal democracy, and
if the discussion concerning the issue is conducted with
civility, then citizens are free to offer and act on whatever
reasons they find compelling. I regard it as an important
49. Michael J. Perry, Why Political Reliance on Religiously Grounded Morality
Is Not Illegitimate in a Liberal Democracy, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 217, 221-22
(2001).
50. Stephen Macedo, Transformative Constitutionalism and the Case of Relig-
ion: Defending the Moderate Hegemony of Liberalism, 26 POL. THEORY 56, 71 (1998);
see also, e.g., Robert Audi, Religious Values, Political Action, and Civil Discourse, 75
IND. L.J. 273, 276 (2000) ("[C]itizens in a liberal democracy have a prima facie
obligation not to advocate or support any law or public policy that restricts
human conduct, unless they have, and are willing to offer, an adequate secular
reason for this advocacy or support .... ).
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implication of the concept of liberal democracy that citi-
zens should have this freedom-that in this regard they
should be allowed to act as they see fit.5
In fact, it strikes me as not only unconvincing, but more than a
little bit illiberal as well, to posit, as a tenet of political morality
and as an obligation attached to democratic citizenship, the
peculiar unsuitability for public discourse of one source-i.e.,
religious faith-of morality, "values," and commitment.5 2 To
impose such an obligation, and to force religious believers to
concede, as the price of admission to the political community,
that they "recognize that religious reasons are not good reasons
for political action," is, as my colleague Paul Weithman has
observed, in effect to deny religious believers "full membership"
in that community.53 As Professor Carter put it, given "[the] abil-
ity of [religion] to fire human imagination .... [religious peo-
ple] should not be forced to disguise or remake themselves
before they can legitimately be involved in [public debate]. '
Professor Elshtain agrees: "If we push too far the notion that, in
order to be acceptable public fare, all religious claims . . . must




We can say, then, that neither a sound understanding of
constitutional law, nor an attractive theory of democratic citizen-
ship, requires the politically-engaged religious believer to cabin,
51. Nicholas Wolterstorff, Audi on Religion, Politics, and Liberal Democracy,
in RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE, supra note 30, at 147 (1997).
52. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Five Reasons to Reject the Claim that
Religious Arguments Should Be Excluded from Democratic Deliberation, 1999 UTAH L.
REv. 639.
Some views-such as advocacy of slavery or cruelty-may be treated by
a liberal society as beyond the pale. But to treat religious views, which
have been, and are, entertained by a large majority of the people,
including many people of eminent reasonableness and good sense, as
within this category, is surely illiberal.
Id. at 654 n.56; Michael J. Sandel, Political Liberalism, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1765,
1772-73 (1994) ("Why must we 'bracket' . .. our moral and religious convic-
tions, our conceptions of the good life? Why should we not base the principles
ofjustice that govern the basic structure of society on our best understanding of
the highest human ends?") (reviewing RAwLs, supra note 25).
53. Weithman, supra note 48, at 534.
54. CARTER, supra note 28, at 232.
55. Jean Bethke Elshtain, State-Imposed Secularism as a Potential Pitfall
of Liberal Democracy (Prague 2000), at http://www.becketfund.org/other/
Prague2000/ElshtainPaper.html (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law,
Ethics & Public Policy).
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bracket, translate, or censor herself before entering the fray.
So-if Christian believers-as Christian believers-do elect to
engage the world, though, then what should we say? Having
overcome the objections of those who would require, as the price
of admission to the public square, that we dis-integrate our relig-
ious faith from our commitment to the common good, how
should we talk, and to what should we speak?
Professor Elshtain asks whether "the full force of Christian
witness [should] be brought to bear on every public policy ques-
tion," or should instead be "reserved . . . to situations of unusual
civic moment and moral challenge[.]" 56 I suspect that the right
answer falls somewhere in between these options. In any event, I
am confident that the problem of the public authority's response
to murderers is one to which we should speak. That said, it does
seem wise to warn those who would unleash the "full force of
Christian witness" in the death penalty debate that they-that
we-ought to take care, to make sure that prophesy is not
watered down to punditry and that we not become so comforta-
ble on the talk-show circuit that we lose the ability to challenge
the world on its Creator's terms.57 Such caution serves not only
the integrity and authenticity of our religious traditions, but also
the society and citizens with whom we are engaged in dialogue-
even Camus could see that the world needs "Christians who
remain Christians. '58 Our calling, again, is not to provide the
death penalty debate with a chorus of church-based "me too's;" it
is not to christen the bullet-point memos of consultants or even
the causes of our political allies; nor is Christianity's task "to
underwrite a politics external to itself."
'59
Which brings us back to the question raised at the outset: If,
as faithful and engaged citizens, we resolve to answer the "Call
for Reckoning" proclaimed in this volume in a way that is true to
the traditions out of which we speak, what should our contribu-
tion be? Recall my opening assertion that moral problems are
anthropological problems, in that moral arguments tend to boil
down to arguments about "moral truth about the human per-
son."6 A recent example: Professor Michael Perry argues, in The
56. Elshtain, supra note 6, at 734 (emphasis omitted).
57. See Thomas L. Shaffer, Faith Tends to Subvert Legal Order, 66 FoRnHAM
L. REV. 1089, 1089 (1998) ("Faith must always resist acculturation, or it will have
nothing to say to the world or to the culture.") (quoting JOHN F. KAVANAUGH,
THE WORD ENCOUNTERED: MEDITATIONS ON THE SUNDAY SCRIPTURES 68 (1996)).
58. ALBERT CAMus, The Unbeliever and the Christian, in RESISTANCE, REBEL-
LION, AND DEATH 70 (Justin O'Brien trans., 1961).
59. Elshtain, supra note 6, at 736.
60. John Paul II, supra note 7.
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Idea of Human Rights, that "[because] every human being is
sacred"-his anthropological premise-it follows that there are
"some things that ought never . . to be done to any human
being"-his moral claim.6
Now, I believe that, for the most part, our Nation's moral
vocabulary, constitutional law, and political discourse-including
its debates about capital punishment-rest upon the unsteady
foundation of a flawed moral anthropology. This superficially
appealing, but in fact untruthful, unreliable, and ultimately
unworthy account of what it means to be human is captured well
in the now-infamous "mystery passage" of the joint opinion in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court's 1992 decision
that re-affirmed the constitutionally mandated abortion license:
"At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life."'6 2 This account of human freedom states an anthro-
pological as well as a legal claim. In fact, what the Casey opinion
provides is not so much a workable constitutional principle, but a
generalized and radical argument about moral self-sufficiency.
And while I agree with Professor Elshtain that the anthropology
offered in Casey is "impoverished," there is no getting around the
fact that it is also, as she puts it, "so deeply entrenched that... it
is simply part of the cultural air we breathe.
63
My claim is that this "deeply entrenched" Casey anthropology
serves as the foundation for, and does much of the important
work in, our communities' public arguments about moral ques-
tions. We-or, at least, many of us-think about the person, and
about her rights and duties, and about her very nature, in Casey's
terms, and the fact that Casey's anthropology provides the scaf-
folding for our arguments cannot help but affect the conclusions
we reach and solutions we offer. We have, by and large,
embraced an account in which the person is and should be
regarded as un-tethered, un-situated, and alone. He is "autono-
mous," not simply in the obvious sense that his choices are not
determined or crudely reducible, but in that the only standards
against which those choices can be evaluated and judged are
those that he generates or endorses. The autonomy of atomized
and rootless individuals is not only given, but good in itself-its
orientation unjudgeable. Agency is more a raw, pre-moral power
than a fragile gift that permits and facilitates the authentic flour-
61. MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR INQUIRIES 7
(1998).
62. 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (joint opinion).
63. Elshtain, supra note 8, at 58.
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ishing of the human person. Conduct is good because it is cho-
sen, not chosen because it is good.64
"Well," one might ask, "so what?" Why not, both as believers
and citizens, embrace and celebrate the autonomy, and thus the
dignity and worth, of the un-tethered self? Why not ground our
faith-based case for the abolition (or the retention) of the death
penalty on the foundation of the Casey anthropology? The diffi-
culty, in my view, that the anthropology of the mystery passage is
not capable of supporting and sustaining a Christian argument-
i.e., the kind of argument that, in this context, Christians should
be making-against (or for) the death penalty. This is not to say
that Casey's vision does not spin off quite sincere talk about
"human dignity"-of course it does. But such talk cannot be sus-
tained by the working anthropological premises.65 The problem,
as Fr. Neuhaus has noted, is "not that it is wrong about the awe-
some dignity of the individual," but that "it cuts the self off from
the source of that dignity."66 As a result, the "dignity" that
emerges from the reining anthropology is more Promethean
than Christian. It is posited to consist precisely in our being self-
governing choosers. It not only includes, but is utterly reducible
to, the capacity to make, and the right to act upon, "autono-
mous" choices.
"Well then," one might respond, "why not put aside these
abstract and probably irrelevant speculations about 'moral
anthropology,' and simply join with those partisans in the death
penalty debate who base their arguments on human fallibility,
discrimination, rehabilitation, or cost?" But I do not think we
can, or that Christians should. Our public morality ought to be
able to support an argument about why it is that a convicted mur-
derer may not be executed. And it is not enough-though it
64. To be clear, the problem, in my view, with Casey is not that it empha-
sizes and celebrates our capacity to seek, choose, and embrace the good, but
that it seems to define the good (for us) solely with reference to the fact of its
having been chosen (by us). The opinion's weakness is not that it celebrates
human autonomy, or even that it links the dignity of the person with his ability
and right to engage in moral decision-making, but rather that it cannot supply
any basis for situating and evaluating moral decisions.
65. See Wilfred M. McClay, The Continuing Irony of American History, FIRST
THINGS 20, 25 (Feb. 2002) ("Without a broadly biblical understanding of the
sources of the dignity of the human person, it is hard to see how that dignity
can continue to have a plausible basis in the years to come."); ALAsDAIR
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MoRAL THEORY 1-5 (2d ed. 1984) (offer-
ing the "disquieting suggestion" that "the language and the appearances of
morality persist even though the integral substantive of morality has .. .been
fragmented, and then in part destroyed").
66. Fr. Richard John Neuhaus, The Liberalism ofJohn Paul I, FIRST THINGS
16 (May 1997).
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might well be politically effective-for death penalty opponents
to argue that "capital punishment does not deter crime" or that
"capital punishment costs too much." These are empirical, not
religious, arguments, and it strikes me as unwise and unfaithful
to pretend otherwise.67 In any event, death penalty supporters
can simply respond by saying that "cost isn't the issue," or per-
haps by showing that executions actually do deter some homi-
cides. Nor is it even enough to point out the facts that our
system of capital punishment is administered unfairly, and even
discriminatorily; that the poor and racial minorities do not
receive adequate representation; and that mistakes are inevita-
ble. These observations do little to say why we should not exe-
cute a guilty, well represented, white man like Timothy McVeigh.
Here is the challenge, then, for Christian witness: If the "cul-
tural air that we breathe" cannot sustain a moral case against the
death penalty, and cannot explain why, in Professor Perry's
words, there are "some things that ought never.., to be done to
any human being," then perhaps this failure presents religious
believers with the opportunity for truth-telling, with the chance
to re-build the debate on sturdier anthropological foundations.
We have, remember, an alternative vision to propose, one that
turns the received anthropology on its head, one that emphasizes
not so much our autonomy and moral self-sufficiency as our
dependence and incompletion.68 After all, that freedom of
choice is a gift, and even that its value is "inestimable,"69 does not
make it the only valuable thing; that we are distinguished by our
capacity for choice does not mean that our dignity is reducible to
that capacity. We are not merely agents who choose, we are peo-
ple who belong, who exist in, and are shaped by, relationships.
We live less in a state of self-sufficiency than in one of "reciprocal
indebtedness. 70 That which is our greatest source of pride is, at
the same time, a constant call to humility.7' A Christian anthro-
pology acknowledges our limits. It recognizes-as Professor Gil-
67. See HAUERWAS, supra note 2, at 20 n.11 (noting the "platitudinous
emptiness of liberal Christian moralizing in which the positions of secular liber-
alism [reappear] in various religious guises").
68. See, e.g., AlASDAIR MACINTYRE, DEPENDENT RATiONA ALIMALS: WHY
HUMAN BEINGS NEED THE VIRTUES (1999).
69. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 833-34 (1975) ("And whatever else
may be said of those who wrote the Bill of Rights, surely there can be no doubt
that they understood the inestimable worth of free choice.").
70. Gilbert Meilaender, Review Essay, Still Waiting for Benedict, FIRST
THINGS 48 (Oct. 1999) (reviewing MAclMRx, supra note 68).
71. SeeJOHN LUKAcs, AT THE END OF AN AGE 204 (2002) ("[T] his assertion
of our centrality... is neither arrogant nor stupid. To the contrary: it is anxious
and modest.").
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bert Meilaender put it recently in a beautiful essay-that we
occupy an "in between" place, "between the beasts and God."7 2
It grounds our dignity not so much in claims of self-sovereignty
as in our status as creatures. 7' That is, it proposes that "the great-
ness of human beings is founded precisely in their being crea-
tures of a loving God,"' 74 and not self-styled authors of their own
destiny. Its fundamental proposition is that "the person is a good
towards which the only proper and adequate attitude is love" and
whose "proper due is to be treated as an object of love. '75 And,
finally, it directs our attention to the question that, in the end,
must be the focus of our struggles with the difficult issue of capi-
tal punishment, namely: "Is the capital sanction 'in conformity
with the dignity of the human person [?] "76
It should be clear that this Essay is offered more as a
prolegomena than a resolution. I am not yet sure what all this
might mean, or what a shift in our anthropological premises and
idiom might yield, in the context of the death penalty debate. I
do not yet know how our arguments would change if our under-
standing of those who have been condemned to die-of their
worth, respect-worthiness, and destinies-rested on different
anthropological presuppositions. I am sure, though, that it
should make a difference; that the debate would sound different;
and that it would, in Professor Shaffer's words, more "truthfully
describe what is going on"7 7 if our arguments reflected and
explicitly proceeded from a "doctrine of human dignity that
turns finally on the client's being a child of God.
78
Certainly, as a Christian, I am confident that we are not
diminished by a faith-inspired shift in focus from autonomy and
choice to creaturehood and dependence. As C.S. Lewis once
wrote, in his essay, The Weight of Glory:
There are no ordinary people. You have never talked to a
mere mortal. Nations, cultures, arts, civilizations-these
72. Gilbert Meilaender, Between Beasts and God, FIRST THINGS 23 (Jan.
2002).
73. See Coughlin, supra note 9, at 619-20.
74. John Paul II, supra note 7.
75. Fr. Thomas Williams, L.C., Capital Punishment and the Just Society,
CATH. DOSSIER, Sept.-Oct., 1998, at 30 (citing KAROL WOJTYLA, LOVE AND
RESPONSIBILITY 41-42 (H.T. Willetts trans., 1995)).
76. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 2267 (2d ed. 1994).
77. Shaffer, supra note 10, at 965.
78. Thomas L. Shaffer, The Unique, Novel, and Unsound Adversay Ethic, 41
VAND. L. REx'. 697, 699 n.7 (1988).
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are mortal, and their life is to ours as the life of a gnat. But
it is immortals whom we joke with, work with, marry,
snub, and exploit-immortal horrors or everlasting
splendours.
79
Our challenge, then, is to frame the debate so that the death
penalty stands or falls not so much on whether or not it is cost-
effective, or deters, or is popular, or is imposed without respect
to race, sex, or class-though all this certainly matters-but on
whether it is consistent with the status, nature, and dignity of the
people on whom it is applied. Our challenge is to propose a
truthful vision of the human person as "the noblest work of
God-infinitely valuable, relentlessly unique, endlessly interest-
ing," and to propose that the question of the death penalty stand
or fall on that. Such a vision-"truthful Christian speech"-is
required "if we are to be faithful to the God we worship."
79. C.S. LEWIS, THE WEIGHT OF GLORY, AND OTHER ADDRESSES 19 (Walter
Hooper ed., rev. & expanded ed. 1980).
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